

Israel-Related Antisemitism, Emotional Involvement, and Pro-Palestinian Protests: Evidence from Three Vignette Experiments among German University Students

Thomas Hinz*

Abstract

Following the Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, antisemitic sentiment was on display at numerous higher education institutions worldwide. Pro-Palestinian activities and demonstrations often coincided with overt and latent antisemitic rhetoric directed toward the Israeli state, as well as toward Jewish students, scientists, and staff residing outside of Israel. This study addresses Israel-related antisemitism at universities in Germany with specific attention to antisemitic resentment. Using comprehensive, current data sets collected among university students in 2023 and 2024 and including three survey experiments, this paper examines how Israel-related antisemitism affects perceptions of the media coverage of the Hamas-Israel war and the potential mobilization of students to engage in pro-Palestinian protests. In line with theoretical concepts, this study considers students' ideological positions and emotional involvement in the issue as drivers of their perceptions of and engagement in protests. The study's results indicate that Israel-related antisemitic attitudes indeed fuel the inclination to see the media coverage of Israeli warfare differently and to participate in protests. Emotional involvement also contributes to students' hypothetical engagement in protests, albeit to a lesser extent.

Keywords: Israel-related antisemitism, protest behavior, media perception, university students, German universities, survey experiments, vignettes.

* University of Konstanz, Germany

Introduction

Germany occupies a unique position in any study of Israel-related antisemitism. Given its Nazi past and the Shoah, the country has developed an unusually strong official commitment to combating antisemitism. Nevertheless, survey research has long documented that Israel-related antisemitism, which expresses anti-Jewish hostility through the prism of criticism of the Israeli state, remains widespread in Germany. In the GMF (*Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit* study group at Bielefeld University) survey 20 years ago, over 44% of German respondents agreed that "given the policy Israel is pursuing, one can well understand having something against Jews" (Heitmeyer, 2005). Since October 7, pro-Palestinian protests have occurred during the Hamas-Israel war, particularly in academic settings. These protests have often expressed antisemitic attitudes. This situation makes the German case interesting. It is a society in which classic antisemitism is heavily tabooed, but where Israel-related antisemitism appears to function as a socially acceptable channel for anti-Jewish sentiment.

German universities have become a particularly salient arena for these tensions since October 7, 2023. Following Hamas's attack on Israel and the subsequent military response, the number of antisemitic incidents in Germany rose significantly, including at universities, where Jewish students were threatened and attacked, and anti-Israeli sentiments were widely reported in the media (RIAS, 2025). Pro-Palestinian protest encampments were established at several German universities in spring 2024 – for instance, at the Free University of Berlin, LMU Munich, and Leipzig University. They were met with police intervention, sparking intense public controversy over the boundaries between legitimate political protest and antisemitic incitement (Associated Press, 2024; Middle East Monitor, 2024). Despite the urgency of the issue, reliable data as well as insightful analyses are scarce.

This paper focuses specifically on the question of whether Israel-related antisemitism triggered the pro-Palestinian protests in Germany. In doing so, it includes an analysis of selective media perceptions about the war and the role of emotional involvement in the issue, which has been proven to drive protest behavior among young people. In line with theoretical concepts from social movement research, the results indicate that Israel-related antisemitic attitudes indeed fuel the inclination of young people to see the media coverage of Israeli warfare differently and to consider participating in protests. Emotional involvement also contributes to students' considering participating in protests, albeit to a lesser extent than antisemitic resentment. The paper relies on two comprehensive surveys among university students in Germany in 2023 and 2024.

Protest Behavior Driven by Ideology and Emotion

Among media observers, there is a broad consensus that the current pro-Palestinian protests have expressed Israel-related antisemitic attitudes. Examples include elements that question the legitimacy of the State of Israel, such as the use of the chant "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" to

encourage participation (ADL, 2025; AJC, 2025; CAM, 2024; Chenoweth et al., 2024). Clearly, Israel-related antisemitism characterizes an ideological position that offers a strong framing for reacting to Israeli military action in Gaza. At the same time, massive collateral damage, and charges of war crimes and "genocide" refer to moral and emotional involvement.

The literature on political protests and social movements highlights the role of ideologies in mobilizing supporters (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013). According to framing theory, protest movements succeed when they present political issues in ways that are morally compelling and resonate with shared values and cultural norms (Benford & Snow, 2000). Activists construct "frames" that define situations as unjust, identify responsible actors, and propose solutions. This framing transforms personal grievances into collective moral causes shared in social groups and networks (Mooijman et al., 2018). These frames often draw on progressive ideological traditions, such as human rights or social justice, to give protests legitimacy. They can also point to ideological frameworks that clearly identify the source of the grievance against which to mobilize.

In this article, I investigate how Israel-related antisemitism can be seen as such an ideological framework. Hostility toward Israel becomes antisemitic when it systematically portrays the Jewish state as evil, illegitimate, or conspiratorial and applies standards to it not used for other nations (Sharansky, 2004). These judgments are embedded within broader prejudices about Jewish power and global influence, partly articulated in the language of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism (Illouz, 2025). Over time, such narratives can develop into coherent belief systems that shape how individuals interpret information about the conflict in the Middle East, pre-structure moral judgments, and filter contradictory evidence. Thus, Israel-related antisemitism functions ideologically by providing a stable worldview that explains the Middle East conflict through stigmatizing and essentializing images of Jews and Jewish collectivity.

This ideology does not base opposition to Israel on specific policies or political critiques. Instead, it relies on a broader moral narrative that delegitimizes Jewish self-determination as inherently unjust. This way of thinking tends to portray Israel as the sole source of global and regional instability and to equate Jewish identity with alleged wrongdoing. It collapses the distinctions between a state, its government, and its people. Like other ideologies, Israel-related antisemitism involves cognitive shortcuts, emotional reinforcement, and a sense of moral certainty, making it resistant to factual correction. It can also become embedded in activist cultures, media discourses, and political movements, where it is transmitted through slogans, symbols, and interpretive routines.

I will also examine the role of emotions and affect in mobilizing supporters. While rationalist models (Opp, 1988) have portrayed protesters as being primarily motivated by cost-benefit calculations, more recent research states that emotions such as anger, moral outrage, empathy, hope, and collective pride are also crucial drivers of participation in protests. Theories of "emotional mobilization" argue that frames become politically powerful when they foster shared feelings. Identification with victims can produce compassion and solidarity, increase the likelihood of protesting, and influence how media

information is perceived. Ideological beliefs, moral interpretations, and emotional responses interact dynamically. Ideology shapes moral judgments, moral frames activate emotions, and emotions reinforce commitment. Thus, protest behavior is a deeply cognitive, normative, and affective form of political action (see Kaur & Yuchtman, 2024, for an example of students as an elite group).

Universities as Left-Leaning Focal Points of Protests

For a long time, university students have been a prominent source of protest mobilization against various grievances. For example, student movements in many countries in the 1960s protested against the Vietnam War. More recently, university students have protested authoritarian tendencies in different countries (Zhao, 1998). While university students have not been prominent in recent protest issues (e.g., the Black Lives Matter, the Fridays for Future movement, and protests against the recent massacre in Iran), pro-Palestinian protests during the war in the Middle East have featured prominently on university campuses – not only in Germany (Chenoweth et al., 2024).

Before the current conflict, there were only a few studies addressing the question of antisemitism among students as a specific group (e.g., Kassis & Schallié, 2013 for Canada and Germany; Saxe et al., 2015 and 2026 for the US). However, after October 7, several protest encampments were set up in German universities, including in Munich and Leipzig, and in smaller university towns, and squatting events occurred at Humboldt University in Berlin. Research on university students shows that their characteristics as generally young, politically liberal, and having a strong desire to conform socially make them fertile ground for political mobilization (Dinas & Geminis, 2013). Although university students do not generally have a stronger interest in politics than the average population, many active interest groups exist that are very willing to engage in certain topics. In general, university students tend to lean more to the political left (Simon, 2022). This is one reason why antisemitic attitudes in academia appear to be a phenomenon of the left, although people on the political right have a significantly greater tendency towards antisemitism than other groups (Hinz et al., 2025).

Definition of Israel-Related Antisemitism and Emotional Involvement

The ongoing and contested debate between scholars over the International Holocaust Remembrance Association's definition of antisemitism (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance [IHRA], 2016) or the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism [JDA], 2021) points to Israel-related antisemitism, particularly the inclusion or exclusion of certain cases in the definition (Herf, 2021). Given that definitions cannot be true or false for epistemological reasons, I suggest defining antisemitism as "an arsenal of resentments collectively discriminating against, devaluing, or demonizing Jews because they are Jews or because they allegedly represent 'Jewish traits'" (Rensmann, 2017, p. 158). Rensmann's definition encompasses current forms of antisemitism, such as demonizing Jews as "collectivized 'white colonizers' and 'alien bodies' in the Arab world" or

equating Nazism with Israel as a "collective Jew" (Rensmann, 2017, p. 158). I consider this definition adequate for including phenomena such as anger against, and hatred, resentment, and fear of Israel as a Jewish state. I also consider antisemitic attitudes as individual characteristics shared by groups who are socialized to accept them and develop these resentments in response to various social contexts.

As mentioned earlier, Israel-related antisemitism can serve as a distinct factor in motivating participation in political protests. It provides an ideological framework that interprets the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through narratives that are hostile and stigmatizing toward Jews and the Jewish collective (Hirsh, 2015). Within this framework, Israel is not viewed primarily as a political actor whose policies can be debated. Rather, Israel is regarded as an inherently illegitimate, immoral, or conspiratorial entity that embodies stereotypes about Jewish power, deceit, and global influence. These interpretations oversimplify complex political realities, reducing them to black-and-white categories of good versus evil. These oversimplifications make protest appear not merely a response to specific events, but a necessary struggle against a perceived fundamental threat.

Emotional involvement is the second driver of protest behavior that I consider (Goodwin et al., 2001). It plays a key role in motivating participation in pro-Palestinian protests, particularly in response to highly visible civilian suffering, which is conceptualized as independent of Israel-related antisemitism. It is fed by extensive media coverage of bombed neighborhoods, displaced families, and injured or killed children. These images evoke emotional reactions such as empathy, sadness, moral shock, and moral outrage. These emotions can transform distant political conflicts such as the Hamas-Israel war into personally meaningful experiences, prompting individuals to feel a sense of moral responsibility to act. From the perspective of social movement theory, such "moral shocks" (Jasper, 1998) lower the threshold for participation in protests by creating an immediate emotional connection to perceived injustice. Thus, involvement in protests often emerges less from ideological hostility toward Israel or Jews than from humanitarian identification with civilian victims and a desire to express solidarity with those perceived as vulnerable and powerless. For many protesters, their participation functions as a moral and emotional response to images of civilian harm. It is aimed at pressuring political actors, raising awareness, and affirming humanitarian values. As a result, emotional mobilization around civilian casualties can generate large-scale pro-Palestinian activism without necessarily implying or requiring antisemitic beliefs, illustrating how empathy-based moral engagement can serve as an independent and powerful driver of political protest.

Clearly, the two drivers of protest can reinforce each other. On an emotional level, an ideological stance can intensify feelings of anger, resentment, and moral certainty, facilitating mobilization. By sharing antisemitic resentments related to Israel, people develop clearly polarized categories of friends and foes. Thus, the combined effects of antisemitism and emotional involvement can promote engagement in protests.

Research Questions

This study focuses on three aspects of pro-Palestinian protests among university students in Germany. First, how do Israel-related antisemitic resentments and emotional involvement contribute to the perception of legitimate versus illegitimate actions in the war? The answer to this question is a precondition for studying the potential mobilization of protesters later on. Second, how are Israel-related antisemitic resentments and emotional involvement related to supporting one-sided goals of the protests, such as supporting Hamas as part of the struggle for Palestinians' liberation or demanding the release of hostages only? Third, how do Israel-related antisemitic resentment and emotional involvement impact support for different kinds of pro-Palestinian encampments? In 2024, such encampments spread rapidly across university campuses in many countries.

I will investigate all three questions using survey experiments in which students evaluate different scenarios to which they are randomly assigned. For the first question, participants viewed verbal media snippets describing war events in December 2023. For the second question, they considered various protest goals in December 2023. For the third question, students indicated how likely they would be to participate in a pro-Palestinian university encampment in December 2024.

Data and Measurements

My reasoning is rooted in empirical research that I conducted after October 7 with surveys. Supported by BMFTR, the Research Group for Higher Education (AG Hochschulforschung) collected nationwide data among university students in December 2023 ($N = 2.369$) and in December 2024 ($N = 2.050$). The study covered all types of universities, in smaller and larger German cities, and included students in various fields of study. Participants registered in two online panels (Bilendi and Kantar) that are commonly used to recruit survey participants. While this method provides rapid data collection, the usual criteria of data quality in survey research such as response rates are somewhat difficult (or impossible) to assess. However, given my focus on the results of three survey experiments in which the stimuli were assigned under randomly controlled conditions, the internal validity of the results is not in question. In addition, both data sets have been adjusted to marginal distributions of gender and field of study in the total populations of students in Germany (Hinz et al., 2024; Hinz et al., 2025).

Before I introduce the three experimental designs in detail, let me briefly outline how I measured both Israel-related antisemitic attitudes and emotional involvement. To empirically measure the resentment of Jews and Israel at the university student level, I used items that have been utilized in previous research that directly connect the State of Israel and Jews or being Jewish with negative feelings about Jews. The three items I chose have been used for two decades in survey studies in Germany (Heyder et al., 2005). The items refer to core dimensions of the definition of Israel-related antisemitism: the collective attribution of Israeli state conduct to Jews as a group, the resentment of Jewish solidarity with Israel, and the equation of Israeli policies with Nazi crimes. All three items go beyond legitimate political criticism of Israeli government policies. They either hold Jews collectively

responsible for the actions of a state, express hostility toward Jews as a group on the basis of their presumed identification with Israel, or invoke historically delegitimizing comparisons that single out Israel in a manner applied to no other nation. As such, all three items fall unambiguously within the scope of antisemitism even under the more restrictive definition of the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA, 2021). This definition explicitly identifies as antisemitic the holding of Jews as collectively responsible for Israeli actions, targeting Jews because of their perceived support for Israel, and drawing Nazi comparisons to delegitimize Israel and its actions rather than analyzing the situation critically.

Emotional involvement with the conflict was measured with a single survey question: How strongly are you emotionally affected by the Palestine-Israel conflict? Responses ranged from 1 “not at all,” 2 “less strongly,” 3 “strongly,” to 4 “very strongly.” Table 1 lists the statements used to test Israel-related antisemitism and the reliabilities of the responses in the 2023 and 2024 studies.

Table 1: Israel-related antisemitism (3-item scale)

Concept	Items	Reliability
Israel-related antisemitism	• With the policy that Israel is pursuing, I can well understand that people have something against Jews.	2023: 0.72
	• It annoys me that Jews all over the world support Israel's policies.	2024: 0.69
	• What the State of Israel is doing to the Palestinians today is in principle no different to what the Nazis did to the Jews in the Third Reich.	

Source: Rapid Response Studies: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 and 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz, see Hinz et al., 2024; Hinz et al., 2025). Reliability coefficient α for both samples.


Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of Israel-related antisemitism for university students (left-hand panel: 2023, two months after October 7; right-hand panel: 2024, after 14 months of war). As explained, the scale summarizes the scores on three individual items and can take values from 1 to 5. Respondents with a value of 1 “do not agree at all” with all three items of the scale, while respondents with a maximum value of 5 “fully agree” with all items.

A look at the distribution of students reveals that significantly more respondents selected “do not agree at all” than “fully agree.” There is a slight shift in the distribution between 2023 and 2024. Compared to 2023, in 2024 there are fewer students answering “do not agree at all” to all three items.

At the same time, the proportion of students with medium values ("partly agree") has risen. Thus, the mean value of the Israel-related antisemitism has increased from 2.23 to 2.36 scale points. This change of .13 scale points is statistically significant ($t = 4.7115$ (df 4347), $p < .001$). Although based on both measurements, the majority of students do not have antisemitic attitudes, one can see an increase in Israel-related antisemitism on average. This result is due mainly to students who partly agreed with these statements (see the higher bar at the midpoint of the scale for 2024 compared to 2023).

Figure 1: Israel-related antisemitism scales for university students (2023 and 2024)

(Frequency distributions in %, scale values from 1 to 5)



Source: Rapid Response Studies: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 and 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). $N_{2023} = 2.369$ and $N_{2024} = 2.050$.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the share of strong cases of Israel-related antisemitic attitudes among university students did not grow. The distributions on the right-hand end with high scores are almost identical for 2023 and 2024. The proportion of students scoring higher than 3 is 15% in 2023 and 16% in 2024. About one-sixth of the students in both samples share medium or high levels of Israel-related antisemitic resentment. I will use this measurement of Israel-related antisemitism in the remainder of this study to see how varying degrees of Israel-related antisemitism support perceptions of the conflict and pro-Palestinian protests at universities.¹

As discussed above, the second potential driving force is emotional involvement. At the end of 2023, most students (61%) reported that they were strongly or very affected by the Middle East conflict. The proportion declined after one year of warfare to 48% (see the complete distribution in the appendix 4). In both years, the correlations between emotional involvement and antisemitic attitudes are quite weak (.07 in 2023 and .11 in 2024).

¹ Data cover university students from all German federal states. However, for some states the number of cases is too small to achieve reliable results with a more fine-grained regional structure.

Survey Experiments Assessing Perceptions of (Il)legitimate Warfare and (Hypothetical) Protest Behavior in 2023 and 2024

If designed properly, survey experiments are a valid and reliable method to illustrate how respondents evaluate scenarios with varying characteristics differently (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015). These experiments can indicate causal relationships between various stimuli and the responses to them, even if the participants do not constitute a random sample of the population. Nevertheless, I included the *heterogeneity of participants* in my analysis by introducing the two variables of Israel-related antisemitic resentment and emotional involvement in the conflict. Doing so allowed me to identify how these two variables affected the outcomes of the experiments I conducted.

As mentioned, I used three experiments to assess the students' (1) perceptions of media content about the war in Gaza and its legitimacy (in December 2023), (2) self-reported support for various protest goals (pro-Palestine or against Hamas in December 2023), and (3) support for pro-Palestinian encampments with distinct characteristics at universities (in December 2024).

(1) Experiment on media content: The legitimacy of the war

How conflicts are presented in the media is important for the potential mobilization of protesters. By selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of a perceived reality, while possibly omitting others, media frames actively shape how audiences define problems, assign moral responsibility, and respond emotionally to events. Entman (1993) stated that framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular definition of a problem and its moral evaluation. In covering a conflict, images of civilian casualties and human suffering elicit stronger emotional responses than abstract thematic reporting. This emotional pathway has direct implications for the connection between media perceptions and ideology. Prior attitudes and ideological dispositions determine how strongly a given frame resonates with individuals and, in turn, what behavioral intentions result.

I began by exploring whether the students' perceptions about the media content related to the Hamas-Israel war and its evaluation depended on their Israel-related antisemitic attitudes and emotional involvement with the situation. This question is embedded in a tradition of research on confirmation bias: people tend to perceive the social world and its reflection in the media according to their own predispositions (Nickerson, 1998).

Therefore, I created six possible scenarios in which there was an attacker: (the Israeli army (IDF) or Hamas) and a target of the military operation: (military [weapons arsenal], mixed [a hospital that

Hamas fighters used as a hideout or a place where IDF forces were present], or civilian [a school]). The participants read the scenarios in the form of a short news report. Table 2 lists the six scenarios.²

Table 2: Six short news reports about the possible scenarios (by target and attacker)

Version	Target	Attacker	Text
A	Weapons storage (purely military target)	IDF	A skirmish occurred around a Palestinian weapons cache. The IDF stormed the building and arrested several Hamas fighters.
B	Weapons storage (purely military target)	Hamas	A skirmish broke out around an Israeli weapons storage facility. Hamas stormed the building and took several Israeli soldiers as hostages.
C	Hospital (military reasons, civilian casualties)	IDF	Fighting has broken out in a Palestinian hospital where Hamas fighters were hiding. According to current estimates, at least 10 civilians are among the dead, and a dozen more have been injured.
D	Hospital (military reasons, civilian casualties)	Hamas	There has been fighting in an Israeli hospital where a delegation of the IDF was present at the time. According to current estimates, at least 10 civilians are among the fatalities, and a dozen more are injured.
E	School (purely civilian)	IDF	The IDF attacked a Palestinian school. It is currently believed that a teacher and several children were killed. People are missing.
F	School (purely civilian)	Hamas	Hamas attacked an Israeli school. It is currently believed that a teacher and several children were killed. Other people are missing.

Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Full factorial of six vignettes employed. IDF: Israel Defense Forces.


Note that the survey experiment was fielded in December 2023 – relatively early after the war started. Each student read three short messages (one from each target group) and rated the degree to which the content of the messages resembled what the student was used to reading in the media channels he/she followed (on a scale of 0 to 10; “does not at all resemble previous readings” to “completely matches previous readings”). The second evaluation task indicated the students’ assessments of the legitimacy of the reported action (from 0 to 10; “not at all legitimate” to “completely legitimate”). Thus, the experiment provides information about both the students’ perceptions of the

² Scenario D (Hamas fighters attacking an Israeli hospital in which an IDF delegation happened to be present) is the least realistic of the six vignettes, as this specific constellation has no clear empirical precedent in the conflict. However, it was included deliberately to complete the factorial design by providing a Hamas/hospital/civilian-casualties cell that is structurally symmetric with Scenario C. Doing so allowed me to isolate the effect of the attacker's identity (IDF vs. Hamas), while holding the type of target and casualty context constant.

conflict based on their media sources and their (possibly double) standards for evaluating the legitimacy of the actions of the two sides. In addition to the target and aggressor dimensions, I included the attitudinal measure of Israel-related antisemitism.

Figure 2 illustrates the results. The y-axis shows the predicted scores for the various experimental groups. The x-axis in the upper two graphs indicates the attacker. The x-axis in the lower two graphs shows the level of the students' Israel-related antisemitism (from 1 to 5).

Figure 2: Media content – students' perceptions and evaluations by attacker, target, and degree of Israel-related antisemitism



Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Regression models in the appendix 1.

The four graphs in Figure 2 depict the fit between one's previous readings (upper left) and one's ratings of the legitimacy of the various actions (upper right). The upper left-hand graph shows that students indicated a fit between their previous reading and the targets only when the IDF was the agent. They reported the strongest fit between their previous reading and the story about IDF attacks on hospitals. This result indicates that the students regarded such stories as dominating their media content. The five other scenarios were of equal fit with their own reading.³ The upper right-hand graph shows the perceived legitimacy of the various scenarios. Military targets ranked highest, dual-use targets (hospitals) were in the middle, and civilian targets ranked lowest. However, IDF attacks on weapons storage facilities were rated as more appropriate than similar attacks by Hamas. The legitimacy of the other scenarios was rated relatively low. Thus, on average, the students were reluctant to consider war activities as legitimate.

To determine the role of Israel-related antisemitic attitudes, I focused on the interaction of Israel-related antisemitism with the attacker. The lower left-hand graph in Figure 2 clearly shows that students who scored higher on Israel-related antisemitic attitudes were less responsive to Hamas' violence. They tended to disregard the Hamas attacks. However, the media perceptions of the IDF attacks did not depend on the respondents' level of resentment. Finally, students with higher Israel-related antisemitic scores, evident in the lower right-hand graph with crossing lines, legitimized Hamas' warfare regardless of the target. While this finding is expected given the dichotomized positions on the conflict, it is important to note the clear pattern of the fourth graph with a steeper slope for the attitude variable of Hamas' warfare.

Additional analyses demonstrate that emotional involvement increases the perceived fit of the media snippets and decreases the legitimacy of military action (see for details Appendix 1). When it comes to the possible interaction of emotional involvement and the attacker, the former seems to be unrelated to judgments about the latter. In sum, there is evidence that media perceptions and evaluations vary by level of ideological resentment. In addition, emotional involvement does not play a role when the warfare of both combatants is evaluated as legitimate.

(2) Experiment on one-sided protest goals

The data from the first survey in December 2023 revealed that the majority of students shared two dominant opinions about what happened or would happen: "The Hamas attack is an act of terror" and "Israel's military action is causing suffering of Palestinians" (Hinz et al., 2024). How do both opinions translate into hypothetical engagement in demonstrations at the university level? Which political goals

³ Empirical analysis confirms that Scenario D and Scenario B received the lowest levels of fit values with previous readings. Respondents were more likely to regard the IDF as the attacker in previous media coverage compared to Hamas.

do students support? How polarized is the spectrum of opinion? What role does Israel-related antisemitism play in this assessment?

To determine how likely the respondents of the 2023 study were to take part in demonstrations at their university, we created six different scenarios that contained specific combinations of political demands on the conflicting parties (for more detailed results, see: Hinz et al., 2024). Here, I focus on two of the most extreme one-sided cases: (1) protesting against the terror of Hamas and for the release of the hostages ("against Hamas") and (2) protesting against Israeli military activities and for the Palestinian struggle for liberation ("pro-Palestinian").

Furthermore, we examined the students' possible mobilization through radicalizing protest elements (burning the Israeli flag, displaying the banners "From the river to the sea: Palestine will be free," and expected clashes with the police) only for the pro-Palestinian scenario.⁴ A distinction was also made according to the expected number of participants in the demonstrations (100, 1,000, 10,000).


Both scenarios were formulated as realistically as possible. The outcome variable was the hypothetical probability of taking part in a demonstration at the university regarding these respective sets of demands (on a scale from 0 "not probable at all" to 10 "highly probable"). Figure 3 illustrates the results. As the figure indicates, average hypothetical mobilization against Hamas was significantly higher compared to the pro-Palestinian demonstration. Note that higher values on the scale from 0 to 10 mean a greater likelihood of mobilization to support the two extreme protest scenarios described. The figure shows that, overall, the students surveyed tended to express their objection to the Hamas attack and their support for releasing the hostages. The extreme pro-Palestinian position involving criticism of the actions of the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip and support for the Palestinian people's struggle for liberation mobilized significantly fewer people.⁵ Note that support for both scenarios is limited. In other words, most students were unlikely to support either extreme position.

⁴ To make the comparisons of the three elements more informative, there was a fourth reference condition: no additional information. The slogan "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" can be understood as a denial of Israel's right to exist. There were legal bans on using the slogan at various demonstrations in Germany.

⁵ The average values are relatively low, ranging between 2.3 and 3.4 on a 10-point scale. This result is due to many students not participating in demonstrations at all.


Figure 3: Average mobilization of respondents by extreme protest scenarios

(Average probability of engaging in protests supporting extreme positions on a scale from 0 = very unlikely to 10 = very likely)



Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Vignettes N = 4,717 (the number refers to two scenarios) Question: How likely would you be to attend this rally?

Given this clear result: How can it be that the universities seem to be a breeding ground for pro-Palestinian protests? While there was more support among students against Hamas two months after October 7, their likelihood of participating in pro-Palestinian protests was remarkably lower. The role of Israel-related antisemitism plays an important motivational role in this mobilization of pro-Palestinian activities. While the hypothetical willingness to participate in a demonstration against the Hamas attack was not affected at all by the level of Israel-related antisemitism, resentment against Israel as a Jewish state triggered a much stronger likelihood of participating in a pro-Palestinian protest. As Figure 4 shows, the slope for Israel-related antisemitism in the case of supporting pro-Palestinian protests is remarkably pronounced. In other words, pro-Palestinian protest behavior is driven by Israel-related antisemitism to a remarkable degree. However, additional radical elements such as slogans, burning the Israeli flag, or expected clashes with the police negatively affected the willingness to participate in pro-Palestinian demonstrations (see Appendix 2a for the related regression models).

Figure 4: Protest probability in 2023 by extreme scenarios and Israel-related antisemitism


Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2023 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Vignettes N = 4,654 (the number of cases now refers to the scenarios, and two scenarios were included in the analysis in each case). Question: How likely would you be to attend this rally?

In accordance with the expectations of social movement theories, emotional involvement in the conflict correlates with a greater likelihood of participating in the protests. Remarkably, there is no interaction effect of emotional involvement with the scenarios (again see the regression results in Appendix 2b).

During 2024, several universities in Western countries reported increased pro-Palestinian activism (CAM, 2024; Chenoweth et al., 2024). Some of these actions escalated into violence, but most of them did not. University students rarely expressed sympathy with Jews, including Jewish students and colleagues, or demanded the release of hostages (Glöckner & Jikeli, 2025), despite the fact that there was greater hypothetical support for protests against the terror attack by Hamas than the hypothetical support for one-sided pro-Palestinian protests. In contrast to this baseline opinion among students, a highly motivated minority of activists succeeded in dominating public perceptions of universities as places supporting the pro-Palestinian movement.

(3) Experiment involving participation in protest encampments.

With the data from December 2024, I was able to widen the observation period to 14 months since October 7. Reported real and hypothetical activity in favor of Israel or the Palestinians was still relatively moderate, despite media attention to several prominent examples. Figure 5 shows that two-thirds of the students remained inactive. While 22% would support pro-Palestinian activities but had not participated in protests, 7% said they supported pro-Israel activities but had not participated in protests. Only 4% and 1% of students reported that they had actively participated in protests favoring Palestinians and Israel, respectively.

Figure 5: Reported actual participation in protests since October 7

Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). N = 2,050. Question: Did you participate in protests since October 7?

Finally, I designed a third experiment exploring support for the most prominent form of pro-Palestinian protests on university campuses--encampments. The experiment consisted of several short vignettes about situations such as illegal behavior, the inclusion of activists from outside the university, the avoidance of violence and verbal or physical confrontation with Jewish students, the questioning of Israel's "right to exist" (*Existenzrecht*), and an optional discussion with Jewish students. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of support for these situations on a scale from 0 "not at all" to 10 "fully support." Table 3 lists the statements describing these situations.

Table 3: Dimensions of the protest encampment experiment


Concept	Text
Legality (2)	The university administration tolerates the protest encampment (reference). / The university administration has banned the protest encampment.
Participants (2)	The vast majority of the participants are students (reference). / The vast majority of the participants are activists from outside the university.
Violence (3)	The encampment remains non-violent (reference). / There are clashes with other students. Jewish students are verbally insulted. / There are clashes with other students. Jewish students are physically harassed.
"Existenzrecht" (2)	The right of Israel to exist is questioned by most of the encampment participants (reference). / The organizers make it clear that they do not question Israel's right to exist.
Discussion with Jewish students (2)	No information (reference). / The encampment organizes a discussion with Jewish students.

Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). The number of attributes for each dimension appears in parentheses. In total, there were 48 vignettes.

One of the characteristics of the protest encampments needs to be explained in more detail. Some people in the German debate about the Middle East conflict refer to the creation of Israel as a nation state in 1948, supported by the UN. The term "Existenzrecht," literally, the right to exist, means recognizing Israel as an independent nation state and affirming the right of the State of Israel, as a Jewish collective, to self-determination. Some people discuss this concept with reference to Zionism as a presumably (post)colonial movement ("taking away the land from the Palestinians"). If one questions the "Existenzrecht," one might question the legitimacy of the State of Israel today. Doing so is connected to the chant "From the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free." While supporting a free Palestine is clearly not antisemitic, it becomes so if the speakers imply the extinction of the State of Israel. I assume that this dimension (questioning/not questioning) is highly relevant to the support for protest encampments.⁶

Like the two other experiments, the third experiment provides clear results about the student sample in general. Figure 6 depicts a plot of the coefficients from a regression model with cluster-robust standard errors. All dimensions significantly affected the degree of support for the encampment. By measuring all of the included dimensions with dummy variables, I could compare effect sizes directly. Note that the coefficients of the dummy variables are interpreted relative to their reference category. For example, in Table 3, for the first variable and its effect, the reference is "the university administration tolerates the encampment." The mean value of support for the encampments is again relatively moderate (3.2 on a scale from 0 to 10). This result reflects the fact that the majority of students do not engage in these activities nor support them.

Figure 6: Elements of the protest encampments and their impact on support for them



Source: Rapid Response: Antisemitism at German Universities 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Vignettes N = 10,170. Question: I am in favor of having this encampment (0 "not at all" to 10 "fully"). Mean value of support: 3.2

⁶ We asked the students a separate question about how they see the "Existenzrecht." Most expressed indifference to the term. In total, most of the students chose the middle category: "There are arguments for and against the "Existenzrecht." Depending on the availability of a "don't know" category, 25 or 46% checked the for/against answer. Only a small minority (6%) bluntly denied the "Existenzrecht."

When the university administration bans the encampment, it becomes less attractive to support it (negative coefficient), but the effect size is comparatively small. The large number of outside activists is also not appreciated, although the effect size is again moderate. Violence in the form of either verbal or physical attacks on Jewish students has large negative results. Considering the mean of 3.2, these coefficients (around -2.0) clearly signal a strong rejection of antisemitic behavior. Almost no one would support a encampment engaged in violence against Jewish students. When encampment organizers make it clear that the goal of the encampment is not to question the existence of the State of Israel, support for the encampments increases substantially (the coefficient of .7 is the second highest). An optional discussion with Jewish students is slightly preferred over not having such an option. In sum, the results describing the type of protest encampment the students prefer hardly correspond to what is described in the mainstream media coverage of violent pro-Palestinian protest encampments (for two examples, see Lindner, 2024; Schulz, 2024).


What about the 15% of students who report Israel-related antisemitic resentment? While the analysis does not appear in the graphs, the degree of Israel-related antisemitism significantly increases support for a pro-Palestinian encampment. One standard deviation in the Israel-related antisemitism score changes the support for the encampment by around .7 scale points. To put it differently, a student with strong Israel-related antisemitic attitudes will support the establishment of a pro-Palestinian encampment to a remarkably greater degree, namely, by around 3 scale points more, in comparison to a student without such resentment.

In addition, the students' emotional involvement once again triggers support for pro-Palestinian encampments, increasing support for them by .4 scale points. While the analysis does not appear in the graphs, those who scored 1.5 point higher on the emotionally involved scale expressed much stronger support for the encampments than those with a neutral emotional attitude towards the conflict. Once again, there was very little correlation between emotional involvement and Israel-related antisemitic resentments.⁷

Finally, I tried to identify how Israel-related antisemitism connects to certain characteristics of the planned encampment. Therefore, the y-axis in Figure 7 indicates the predicted outcomes, and the x-axis denotes the ranges on the antisemitism scale. The lines indicate the varying social contexts of the encampments.

⁷ Based on the results of a Wald test for equality of z-standardized scores of Israel-related antisemitism and emotional involvement, I rejected the null hypothesis: $F(1, 2013) = 10.71, p = .0071$.

Figure 7: Support for pro-Palestinian encampments by degree of violence, attitudes toward “Existenzrecht,” and Israel-related antisemitism



Source: Rapid Response Study: Antisemitism at German Universities 2024 (Research Group on Higher Education, University of Konstanz). Vignettes N = 10,170. Question: I am in favor of having this encampment (0 “not at all” to 10 “fully”). Mean value of support: 3.2

Both subgraphs of Figure 7 reveal robust interaction effects with Israel-related antisemitism. Thus, the slopes of Israel-related antisemitism are significantly different for the varying characteristics of the encampments described in the vignettes. In the left-hand graph, respondents with higher levels of Israel-related antisemitism (a score of 5 or above) no longer made significant distinctions between their support for violent and non-violent encampments (i.e. the confidence intervals of the estimates for the three categories describing antisemitic violence overlapped). The right-hand graph shows a similar pattern. For those with higher levels of Israel-related antisemitism, the questioning of the “Existenzrecht” by the encampment’s organizer had no impact on support for the encampment (for detailed results see Appendix 3).

Taken together, pro-Palestinian support is indeed affected by the emotional involvement of students who feel aggrieved for the people of Gaza. However, a further independent and relatively stronger predictor of support for the encampments is resentment against Israel as the “Jewish state.” For students who share these antisemitic attitudes, the principle of non-violent protest is not as effective. They also tend to ignore the “Existenzrecht” in their support for the protests. One minor note of optimism is the small positive effect of possible discussion with Jewish students on the attractiveness of the protests. I take this as a cautious sign of the willingness to seek dialogue with Jewish students and teachers.

Conclusion and Outlook

Antisemitism related to Israel is a reality among German students. Approximately 15% of students in my heterogeneous sample exhibited this form of antisemitism. Those who expressed high levels of antisemitic resentment were among the strongest supporters of pro-Palestinian protests. In addition, Israel-related antisemitic attitudes changed perceptions and evaluations of the conflict (first

experiment) and the inclination to participate in pro-Palestinian protests (second and third experiments). These attitudes intensified the likelihood of engaging in these protests when they met with the denial of "Existenzrecht" and blurred the boundaries between nonviolent and violent protests (including antisemitic behavior).

How does the German situation relate to campuses in other countries? There are only a few other larger studies with reliable data sources. My findings are broadly consistent with evidence from a recent study from the US, where Israel-related antisemitism on university campuses has attracted some empirical attention since October 7, 2023. A comprehensive survey of nearly 4,000 undergraduate students at 303 four-year colleges and universities in the US conducted by the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University in the first semester of the 2025–26 academic year (Saxe et al., 2026) found that 15% of students held views about Israel that most Jews consider antisemitic, and 9% held explicitly hostile views toward Jews as a group. The striking parallel between this 15% figure and the approximately 15% prevalence of Israel-related antisemitism identified in this sample of German university students suggests that this form of prejudice may operate at comparable levels across different higher education systems, despite substantial differences in their historical contexts, institutional cultures, and the legal framing of antisemitism.

The Brandeis study also found that antisemitism on campus is not a single phenomenon. Jewish students expressed concerns about antisemitism from both the political right and the political left. They also encountered Israel-related antisemitism, and antisemitism expressed as traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes. Taken together, the German and US findings point to a transnational challenge. Institutions of higher education in Western democracies have difficulty containing a form of antisemitism that is ideologically rationalized and increasingly normalized within specific campus subcultures.

Thus, Israel-related antisemitism begins with the development of crude prejudices that paint Israel as an "evil" collective of Jews. The survey experiments also confirm that the humanitarian situation in Gaza contributes to pro-Palestinian activism. Although the data analysis shows only a slight increase in Israel-related antisemitism between 2023 and 2024, the climate of opinion against Israel and Israeli politics on campus (and most likely elsewhere) may have worsened significantly due to the lengthy military campaign and many civilian victims. While the average emotional involvement of students in the Middle East conflict has decreased over time, the core group of activists may have radicalized.

Connected to this trend, a relatively new but salient feature of Israel-related antisemitism seems to be the pervasive questioning of the State of Israel's right to exist. Remarkably, this sentiment is even endorsed by a significant proportion of students who are not affected by the attitudinal items that were used to measure Israel-related antisemitism, meaning those not inclined to be specifically antisemitic. The phenomenon of questioning Israel's right to exist warrants further examination and points to a necessary adaptation of measurements of antisemitic attitudes. This attitude persists despite the state's establishment over 75 years ago and its current population of approximately 9.7 million, 21% of whom are Arab citizens. The discourse surrounding Israel's right to exist perpetuates the myth of Israel as a

"stranger in the Arab world." This narrative ignores the fact that the vast majority of Jews and their descendants who lived in Arab countries before 1948 have since moved to Israel.

In conclusion, a significant proportion of university students in Germany exhibit Israel-related antisemitic attitudes. In addition, contemporary antisemitic sentiment has gained traction – indicated by a rising number of antisemitic incidences. Significant time and effort will be required to reorient the discourse surrounding Israel as a legitimate and democratic state.

References

- ADL. (2025). *Campus antisemitism report card 2.0*. <https://www.adl.org/campus-antisemitism-report-card>
- AJC Berlin & Jüdische Studierendenunion Deutschland. (2025). *Lagebericht Antisemitismus an deutschen Hochschulen*. AJC Berlin. https://ajcgermany.org/system/files/document/Lagebericht_digital.pdf
- Associated Press. (2024, May 7). Police break up pro-Palestinian student protest in Berlin as demonstrations spread across Europe. *Voice of America*. <https://www.voanews.com/a/police-break-up-pro-palestinian-student-protest-in-berlin-as-demonstrations-spread-across-europe/7601207.html>
- Auspurg, K., & Hinz, T. (2015). *Factorial survey experiments*. Sage.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611–639. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>
- Chenoweth, E., Hammam, S., Pressman, J., & Ulfelder, J. (2024). Protests in the United States on Palestine and Israel, 2023–2024. *Social Movement Studies*, 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2024.2415674>
- Combat Antisemitism Movement. (2024). *Surge in campus antisemitism: A comparative analysis of September 2024 vs. pre-October 7th 2023*. Antisemitism Research Center. <https://combatantisemitism.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Surge-in-Campus-Antisemitism-.pdf>
- Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). *Social movements: An introduction* (2nd ed.). Blackwell.
- Dinas, E., & Gemenis, K. (2013). Revisiting the role of process incentives as a determinant of university students' protest. *European Political Science Review*, 5(2), 225–253. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000112>
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x>

- Glöckner, O., & Jikeli, G. (Eds.). (2025). *Antisemitismus in Deutschland nach dem 7. Oktober 2023*. Olms Verlag bei Nomos.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds.). (2001). *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. University of Chicago Press.
- Heitmeyer, W. (Ed.). (2005). *Deutsche Zustände* (Vol. 3). Suhrkamp.
- Herf, J. (2021). IHRA and JDA: Examining definitions of antisemitism in 2021. *Fathom Journal*. <https://fathomjournal.org/ihra-and-jda-examining-definitions-of-antisemitism-in-2021/>
- Heyder, A., Iser, J., & Schmidt, P. (2005). Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus. In W. Heitmeyer (Ed.), *Deutsche Zustände* (Vol. 3, pp. 144–165). Suhrkamp.
- Hinz, T., Marczuk, A., & Multrus, F. (2024). *Student opinions on the escalation of violence in Israel and Gaza and antisemitism at German universities* (Working Paper No. 17). Working Paper Series of the Cluster "The Politics of Inequality," University of Konstanz. <https://doi.org/10.48787/kops/352-2-rq7tb902qh9g8>
- Hinz, T., Marczuk, A., & Multrus, F. (2025). *Antisemitism and pro-Palestine protests at German universities: Survey results among students and university rectorates* (Working Paper No. 44). Working Paper Series of the Cluster "The Politics of Inequality," University of Konstanz. <https://doi.org/10.48787/kops/352-2-1dvym5qkadm3>
- Hirsh, D. (2015). Anti-Zionism and antisemitism: Cosmopolitan reflections. In C. A. Small (Ed.), *The Yale papers: Antisemitism in comparative perspective* (pp. 57–174). ISGAP.
- Illouz, E. (2025). *Der 8. Oktober* (M. Adrian, Trans.). Suhrkamp. (Original work published 2024)
- International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. (2016). *Working definition of antisemitism*. <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>
- Kassis, W., & Schallié, C. (2013). The dark side of the academy: Antisemitism in Canadian and German students. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 5(1), 63–92.
- Kaur, H., & Yuchtman, N. (2024). Protests on campus: The political economy of universities and social movements. *Comparative Economic Studies*, 66, 621–638. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41294-024-00248-8>
- Klandermans, B., & Van Stekelenburg, J. (2013). Social movements and the dynamics of collective action. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (2nd ed., pp. 774–811). Oxford University Press.
- Lindner, J. (2024, May 7). Palästina-Protest in Berlin: Demonstranten besetzen Innenhof an der FU—Polizei sperrt Gelände ab. *Der Tagesspiegel*. <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/palastina-protest-in-berlin-demonstranten-besetzen-innenhof-an-der-fu--polizei-sperrt-gelände-ab-11627366.html>

- Middle East Monitor. (2024, June 12). Germany investigating academics supporting pro-Palestine student protests. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240612-germany-investigating-academics-supporting-pro-palestine-student-protests/>
- Mooijman, M., Hoover, J., Lin, Y., Ji, H., & Dehghani, M. (2018). Moralization in social networks and the emergence of violence during protests. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 2, 389–396. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0353-0>
- Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(2), 175–220. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175>
- Opp, K.-D. (1988). Grievances and participation in social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 53(6), 853–864. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095895>
- Rensmann, L. (2017). *The politics of unreason: The Frankfurt School and the origins of modern antisemitism*. SUNY Press.
- RIAS. (2025). *Antisemitische Vorfälle in Deutschland 2024* [Annual report]. https://www.report-antisemitism.de/annuals/04-06-25_RIAS_Bund_Jahresbericht_2024.pdf
- Saxe, L., Sasson, T., Wright, G., & Hecht, S. (2015). *Antisemitism and the college campus: Perceptions and realities*. Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University.
- Saxe, L., Wright, G., & Hecht, S. (2026). *Antisemitism and prejudice on campus*. Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University. <https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/antisemitism/antisemitism-prejudice-campus.html>
- Schulz, B. (2024, May 30). Propalästina-Proteste an deutschen Unis: Wo endet die Meinungsfreiheit? *taz*. <https://taz.de/Propalaestina-Proteste-an-deutschen-Unis/!6012172/>
- Sharansky, N. (2004). Foreword. *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 16(3–4). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25834600>
- Simon, E. (2022). Demystifying the link between higher education and liberal values: A within-sibship analysis of British individuals' attitudes from 1994–2020. *British Journal of Sociology*, 73(5), 967–984. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12972>
- Zhao, D. (1998). Ecologies of social movements: Student mobilization during the 1989 prodemocracy movement in Beijing. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103(6), 1493–1529. <https://doi.org/10.1086/231399>

Appendix Table 1: Perception of media snippets (fit with previous readings and legitimacy) by targets and attacker

VARIABLES	(1) Fit	(2) Fit	(3) Fit	(4) Legitimate	(5) Legitimate	(6) Legitimate
<i>Target (ref. military target)</i>						
Double use target	0.390*** (0.0585)	0.389*** (0.0588)	0.393*** (0.0585)	-1.369*** (0.0634)	-1.368*** (0.0618)	-1.369*** (0.0634)
Civilian target	0.0431 (0.0600)	0.0392 (0.0596)	0.0434 (0.0600)	-2.159*** (0.0679)	-2.148*** (0.0666)	-2.159*** (0.0679)
<i>Attacker (ref. IDF)</i>						
Attacker: Hamas	-0.491*** (0.0653)	0.181 (0.186)	0.931*** (0.259)	-1.006*** (0.0712)	-3.003*** (0.193)	-0.718*** (0.276)
Israel-related antisemitism	-0.196*** (0.0497)	-0.0497 (0.0595)	-0.197*** (0.0494)	0.234*** (0.0539)	-0.202*** (0.0674)	0.233*** (0.0539)
Att. Hamas#IS antisemitism		-0.301*** (0.0794)			0.894*** (0.0814)	
Emotional involvement	0.167*** (0.0609)	0.166*** (0.0610)	0.414*** (0.0707)	-0.114* (0.0634)	-0.111* (0.0625)	-0.0640 (0.0838)
Att. Hamas#Emotional involvement			-0.525*** (0.0967)			-0.107 (0.103)
Constant	5.605*** (0.208)	5.279*** (0.219)	4.935*** (0.226)	4.499*** (0.211)	5.466*** (0.227)	4.363*** (0.252)
Observations	6,942	6,942	6,942	6,943	6,943	6,943
R-squared	0.020	0.023	0.026	0.128	0.148	0.128

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; grey shaded coefficients indicate interaction effects

Data source: Rapid Response Study 2023, University of Konstanz

Appendix Table 2a: Support of potential demonstration goals – extreme scenarios

VARIABLES	(1) Pro Israel only	(6) Pro Palestine only
Israel-related antisemitism	-0.0713 (0.0721)	1.292*** (0.0609)
Emotional involvement	0.851*** (0.0852)	0.756*** (0.0769)
<i>Additional features (ref. without)</i>		
Burning the flag	0.167 (0.175)	-0.890*** (0.155)
Slogan „From the river to the sea“	0.0152 (0.175)	-0.397** (0.156)
Expected clashes with police	0.268 (0.174)	-0.496*** (0.154)
<i>Expected number of participants (ref. 100)</i>		
1,000	0.124 (0.152)	-0.0606 (0.132)
10,000	-0.0307 (0.148)	0.0391 (0.130)
Constant	0.906*** (0.305)	-2.096*** (0.263)
Observations	2,317	2,315
R-squared	0.047	0.226

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Data source: Rapid Response Study 2023, University of Konstanz

Appendix Table 2b: Support of demonstration goals (interaction effects of pro-Palestinian scenario with Israel-related antisemitism/emotional involvement)

VARIABLES	(1) # IS antisemitism	(2) # emotional involvement
<i>Scenario (ref. pro Israel)</i>		
Pro Palestine	-3.822*** (0.187)	-0.927*** (0.258)
Israel-related antisemitism	-0.0691 (0.0720)	0.605*** (0.0538)
Pro Palestine#IS antisemitism	1.350*** (0.0795)	
Emotional involvement	0.799*** (0.0667)	0.777*** (0.0878)
<i>Additional features (ref. without)</i>		
Burning the flag	-0.366*** (0.118)	-0.325*** (0.120)
Slogan From the river to the sea	-0.192* (0.116)	-0.144 (0.120)
Expected clashes with police	-0.109 (0.115)	-0.0791 (0.118)
<i>Expected number of participants (ref. 100)</i>		
1,000	0.0408 (0.102)	0.0504 (0.104)
10,000	0.00482 (0.0995)	0.00449 (0.102)
Pro Palestine#IS antisemitism		0.0442 (0.104)
Constant	1.335*** (0.257)	-0.145 (0.270)
Observations	4,632	4,632
R-squared	0.145	0.101

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; grey shaded coefficients indicate interaction effects
 Data source: Rapid Response Study 2023, University of Konstanz

Appendix Table 3: Support of pro-Palestinian camp by characteristics, Israel-related antisemitism and emotional involvement

VARIABLES	(1) Support of camp	(2) Support of camp with interaction of violence/IS AS	(3) Support of camp with interaction of IS right to exist/IS AS
<i>University administration (ref. tolerates the camp)</i>			
- University administration bans the camp	-0.288*** (0.0534)	-0.291*** (0.0533)	-0.288*** (0.0534)
<i>Participants (ref. mostly internal students)</i>			
- Mostly external activists	-0.432*** (0.0538)	-0.440*** (0.0535)	-0.431*** (0.0535)
<i>Antisemitic violence (ref. no violence)</i>			
- Some clashes/verbal insults against Jewish students	-1.995*** (0.0762)	-3.149*** (0.222)	-1.996*** (0.0761)
- Some clashes/physical attacks against Jewish students	-2.215*** (0.0767)	-2.970*** (0.218)	-2.214*** (0.0765)
Israel-related antisemitism	0.718*** (0.0556)	0.449*** (0.0757)	0.899*** (0.0630)
- Verbal insults#IS antisemitism		0.488*** (0.0902)	
- Physical attacks#IS antisemitism		0.320*** (0.0902)	
<i>Israel's right to exist (ref. questioned)</i>			
- Israel's right to exist out of question	0.746*** (0.0593)	0.747*** (0.0593)	1.616*** (0.171)
<i>Integration of Jewish students (ref. no information)</i>			
- Discussion with Jewish students	0.241*** (0.0514)	0.242*** (0.0515)	0.237*** (0.0514)
Emotional involvement	0.508*** (0.0652)	0.508*** (0.0652)	0.508*** (0.0651)
- Right to exist out of question#IS antisemitism			-0.368*** (0.0705)
Constant	1.523*** (0.221)	2.163*** (0.252)	1.091*** (0.230)
Observations	10,054	10,054	10,054
R-squared	0.197	0.201	0.200

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; grey shaded coefficients interaction effects
 Data source: Rapid Response Study 2024, University of Konstanz

Appendix Table 4: Distribution of emotional involvement (university students)

How strongly are you emotionally affected by the Palestine-Israel conflict?	2023	2024
Not at all	4.3	7.9
Less strongly	34.4	43.9
Strongly	45.9	39.3
Very strongly	15.3	8.9
	N=2,352	N=2,050

Relative frequency in percent
Data Source: Rapid Response Studies 2023 and 2024, University of Konstanz